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The relationship between multinational firms
and the state institutions of less-developed
economies is a central question for several
reasons. First, many analysts have suggested that
the State in less-developed countries plays a
major role in shaping the emerging social struc-
ture, through state control of much capital ac-
cumulation and state manipulation of access to
many economic opportunities.1 The state's
relationship with multinational firms is likely to
affect how this fundamental social role is played
who gains, who loses, and what the long-term
effects of such distribution are on development
patterns, Second, many defenders of direct
foreign investment have posited a key role for
the host-country state in assuring that less-
developed nations benefit from the local
activities of multinational firms.2 Such a posi-
tion, however, assumes that the host-country
state has sufficient independence from such
firms to exercise a monitoring or controlling
functionand that assumption needs testing.
This article discusses evidence about the State-
multinational relationship in one African coun-
try, Kenya, based on research carried out there
in l972-73. Kenya, of course, is a particular
case, and this means that the analysis cannot
automatically be generalised. Kenya was one of
the few African countries which experienced
settler colonialism; and this may underly certain
forms of the State-multinational relationship.
Kenya, too, has received most of its pcist-
independence direct foreign investment in
import-substitution manufacturing; this dis-
tinguishes it from countries like Zambia or
Gabon (or even Nigeria) where the concentra-
tion has been on resource sector investment; it
also differentiates it from others (like Tanzania
or Somalia) where relatively little multinational
1 See, for instmce, Alavi (1972), Saul (1974), Lamb (1975).
2 See, for instance, Chudson (1973), Reuber (1973).3 This research included an interview survey of 81 multi-
national subsidiaries in Kenya, and a comparative survey of
competing kcal enterprises in three industries (soap manu-
facturing, shoe production and fluorspar mining). In the
subsidiary survey, the original sample of 94 firms covered
all manufacturing subsidiaries with O or more employee
plus most major subsidiaries in commerce, banking, oil dis-
tribution, advertising, mineral e,itraction and transport; some
86 per cent of firms agreed to the interview, though not all of
these were prepared to provide all the information requested.
Details oi the study are reported in Langdon (1976).
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activity has been concentrated. Nevertheless, the
Kenyan example does suggest that some
common social processes are at work which are
likely to be of relevance to other developing
countries as well.
A typical post-independence social process
which is evident in Kenya is the widespread
emergence of African business interests-
interests that have used their ties with the
African political leadership to build up their
assets and take on lucrative new activities.4
From this amalgam of business interests and
political leaders a new social class has gradually
developed that can be termed an indigenous
bourgeoisie. The relationship of this bourgeoisie
to the multinationals is of considerable import-
ance in analysing the dynamics of social struc-
turing in countries like Kenya.
Three ways of analysing this relationship can
be identified. One position, that of Warren,
suggests that as its accumulation accelerates and
its bargaining skill grows, local capital will
squeeze foreign capital more and moreand
ultimately generate dynamic independent
capitalist development in the less-developed
country (Warren, 1973). A second position, that
of Leys, sees an unstable alliance existing
between an 'auxiliary' domestic bourgeoisie and
international firms, an alliance with internal
contradictions that will sooner or later lead to
a breakdown in relations, thereby generating
more revolutionary restructuring (Leys, 1975,
chapter 8). Third, it is also possible to analyse
these relations in terms of dependency theory:
Osvaldo Sunkel's model of "transnational integra-
tion" (Sunkel, 1973 and 1974). Such a model
suggests a more complex intermeshing of foreign
and local capital, and thus a much more stable
alliance between the twoat the expense of that
great majority of poorer citizens in the less-
developed country who are not integrated into
the relationship. This view would predict
neither dynamic independent capitalist develop-
ment nor imminent breakdown in the periphery
country's political economy.
Clearly, which sort of relationship is taking
shape is critical in assessing the impact of multi-
nationals in less-developed countries. Warren's
4 For thtais of this emergence see Leys (1975, chapter 5)
and Marris and Somerset (1971).
view, for instance, leads one to expect that multi-
nationals' operations will ultimately spark off
dynamic development effects, while Sunkel's
view leads to a much more negative assessment
of the multinationals' impact on peripheral social
structures (Sunkel, 1974).
This article examines the role of the State in
this ongoing set of relationships first through an
illustration of the relations between the State,
the multinationals and the local bourgeoisie; then
by analysing their implications and considering
their economic basis.
MNCs and the State in Kenya: some examples
Relations between multinational firms and the
Kenyan State are complex and intimate. Any
detailed study of such relations therefore has to
analyse a wide range of instruments and regula-
tions on the state's side, and a myriad of
channels of communication and influence on the
firms' side.5 For illustrative purposes, though,
one can take representative examples of multi-
national-state interaction chosen because they
illuminate the dynamics of relations among the
State, the multinationals and the local
bourgeoisie. The five cases outlined here convey
reasonably accurately the results of my overall
research findings in Kenya, though each case is
special in the sense of capturing a particular
facet of the relationship.
The first case involves the soap and shoe multi-
nationals that dominate their respective indus-
tries in Kenya. The State has clearly played an
important role in the success of these sub-
sidiaries against their international competitors,
in that state trade barriers have excluded most
competition of this kind. But the State has also
been instrumental in securing the success of the
multinationals against resident-owned firms-
especially through manipulation of tax imposi-
tions. In soap, subsidiaries produce relatively
low-bulk, high unit price products (detergents
and toilet soap), while local firms produce rela-
tively high-bulk, low unit price products
(laundry soap and soap power). The excise tax,
as implemented, is levied by weight, and con-
sequently constitutes a much higher percentage
of the sale price of local firm products than of
subsidiary products. As the National Assembly
representative for Mombasa Island noted in the
1966 debate on the tax, low-grade laundry soap
sold at Shs. 50/- per 100 pounds, and the tax(of Shs. 0/25 per pound) would therefore in-
crease its price by 50 per cent; while for "twelve
5 These instruments and channels are analysed in considrab1e
detail in Langdon (1976).
dozen tablets of Lux (toilet) soap, which is
equivalent to 30 pounds, the selling price is
Shs. 87/-, but the excise duty is only Shs. 7/50,
and the increase is less than 9 per cent" (Kenya
Government 1966: 727, 1010 and 1156). The
damage done by this tax structure was stressed
by local soap manufacturers interviewed in
Kenya. However, the government claimed that
administrative difficulties made any variation in
tax levies by product prices impossible.
In 1972, however, the government extended this
tax to shoes, a product which local firms produce
at a higher price than the MNC subsidiary,
which dominates low unit price output (in
plastic sandals for instance). In this case a non-
differentiated tax would clearly hurt the sub-
sidiary and benefit local firms. But administra-
tive difficulties suddenly disappeared. Before im-
plementing the new tax, government asked the
multinational subsidiary how it wanted the tax
applied and acted accordingly: the result was a
differential tax rate with a lower percentage on
low unit price shoes, and a higher percentage
on higher price shoes. Shoes priced at Shs. 7/50
or below (such as multinational-made sandals)
were taxed at Shs. 0/25 per pair, while shoes
priced between Shs. 50/- and 75/- were taxed at
Shs. 6/- per pair (Kenya Government, 1972).
A second case involves a radio-assembly firm
in Kenya. Formerly organised under completely
local ownership with a disastrous business
record this firm was restructured in 1969. Local
Africans and a government parastatal (the In-
dustrial and Commercial Development Corpora-
tionICDC) took a majority share, but drew in a
multinational as a 45 per cent partner. The multi-
national provided technical training, financing,
mánagerial assistance, intermediate inputs and
trade mark rights. The local African business-
men had very close government ties and the
government not only provided comprehensive
import protection, but also used its ICDC hold-
ings in another large multinational's distributing
chain to force that chain to carry the trade-
marked product, though it had previously
carried only a competitive brand. The result
was spectacular firm expansion and profitability
shared by local Africans and the State through
their equity holdings and by the multinational
through its dividends, sales of inputs and royalty
fees (3 per cent of all sales). The multinational was
reportedly very pleased with the arrangement
because of the excellent contact the local
Africans had with the State, and was according
ly accelerating technical training and the trans-
fer of sophisticated products. The local
37
Africans were even more pleased with the mono-
poiy rents the multinational trade mark was
permitting them to earn.
A third case involves takeover of a local Asian-
owned tanning extract firm. A group of local
Africans and a multinational (which owned
Kenya's other tanning extract enterprise)
planned to take ownership of the firm. Such
takeovers, however, require approval by the
Kenya government's Capital Issues Committee,
a body based in the Treasury and drawing rep-
resentatives from other ministries. In the con-
text of this committee's deliberations, debate
took place between the multinational and the
local partners about the terms of the takeover.
The former first insisted on 51 per cent ownership;
the latter then countered with a proposal that
they take 75 per cent; and the CIC finally used its
power to arrange a compromise agreement,
giving the multinational a one-third shareholding
plus a management contract (and fee) with the
new firm.
A fourth case also concerns the shoe industry.
A group of African executives from the multi-
national shoe subsidiary described above
recently left (in some anger) to start their own
shoe manfacturing enterprise. Conflict with their
former employer increased, as the latter was
accused of trying to sabotage their machinery
orders abroad. Despite this the new firm has been
quite successfulunlike the majority of local shoe
enterprises. This success rests on the new firm's
close state ties. It has received state loans and
support as part of the ICDC-organised Nairobi
industrial estate; various political figures are
among its shareholders; and in the face of sub-
sidiary harassment it was able to ask government
officials to intervene in order to organise its
machinery imports. In addition, government
orders for nurses' shoes stimulated its early
business. Similarly, the only clearly successful
local soap firm competing with the subsidiaries
was half-owned by a senior civil servant, and
had received important soap orders from the
Ministry of Works.
Finally, a fifth case also revolves around the
multinational shoe subsidiary. A local firm
sought to win the right to supply it with eyelets,
for its shoes, which had previously been im-
ported. The subsidiary resisted, however, and
conflict became bitter, with the local firm gain-
ing support from the then Minister of Com-
merce and Industry. Finally, however, President
Kenyatta is said to have intervened personally,
declaring that the shoe subsidiary was "our
friend", and forcing all parties to attend a large
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meeting where the issue was successfully re-
solved, the subsidiary having the final decision
in the matter.
Each of these cases is, of course, unique. But
they also represent certain broad tendencies
evident in Kenya. And such tendenciesperhaps
contradictory, yet perhaps ultimately consistentjustify some theoretical speculation: this is
offered in the next section.
Implications and speculations
The above cases may appear contradictory. The
State sometimes helps to structure the economy
in favour of subsidiaries and against local enter-
prise; but it also sometimes helps local enter-
prise against the multinationals. One explanation
could simply be that the State has many arms,
and some respond to certain pressures, while
others respond to the influence of opposing
groups; but such a pluralist notion, while un-
doubtedly reflecting some real divisions among
state institutions, nevertheless provides too easy
and simplistic an answer. There is a more
sophisticated consistency to these patterns of
political economy.
Certainly one finding is evident from all these
cases: the key role of the State in shaping eco-
nomic relationships within Kenya. Much of the
material from my field research suggests that,
as in the first and second cases above, this role
is usually exercised in co-operation with, and
to the benefit of, the multinational sector in
Kenya. As the cases show, however, the State
clearly maintains some independence in this
relationship with the multinationals. There
seems, in fact, to be a mutually dependent
symbiosis at work. The modern Kenyan State
clearly has some sophisticated economic instru-
ments to use (differential taxes, widesread share-
holdings, etc.), and the multinationals seem to
rely, to a degree, on such manipulation for
their surplus appropriation within Kenya.
It seems clear, however, from the fourth case
especially, that the Kenyan State is also prepared
to play its regulative, protective role on behalf
of the local bourgeoisie, even when certain
subsidiaries may be threatened. There is a local
bourgeoisie emerging in Kenyaand it too has
an intimate relationship with the State. That
relationship, as the second and third cases imply,
however, is being increasingly meshed with the
State-multinational relationship in even more
complex forms of symbiosis. Again, the Kenyan
State has sophisticated instruments with broad
discretionary powers (particularly the CIC) that
permit it to organise and enforce such inter-
meshing.
lt would, of course, be possible like Warren
(1973) to regard such developments as evidence
that the domestic bourgeoisie is eager and able
to squeeze foreign capital. In the same way, the
fourth case might be said to illustrate Leys' (1975)
prediction of emerging conflict between foreign
and 'auxiliary' capital. Overall, though, the com-
bination of these first four cases could illustrate
a careful State-sponsored process of intermeshing
and organising multinational-local bourgeois rela-
tions in such a way as to develop a stable, long-
term symbiosis at the top of the Kenyan political
economy. The fifth case, with its evidence of
State willingness to intervene to defuse conflict,
would seem to justify this perspective. Foreign
capital is not forced to sacrifice surplus appro-
priation as part of the symbiosisas the generous
terms in case 2 and the management contract pro-
visions in case 3 illustrate. But the State is success-
fully shuffling prominent Africans into the domi-
nant regulated economyas multinational part-
ners, executives, and even competitors.
The multinationals' willingness to co-operate in
this process is not that surprising in the context
of case 5. In the end, the multinational sector
seems able to count on the State playing an over-
riding role in the political economy, managing
the mechanics of symbiosis should they threaten
to get out of hand, and thereby defending the
long-term role of multinationals in Kenya. It is
this that undercuts Warren's perspective: it is not
an independent bourgeoisie which is emerging in
Kenya and itself manipulating the State apparatus.
Rather the State's symbiosis with the multi-
national sector gives it an institutional independ-
ence vis-a-vis that emerging local bourgeoisie,
while at the same time the latter remains heavily
dependent on the State for its surplus appropria-
tion. This makes it possible for the Kenyan State
to enforce the over-riding Kenyan symbiosis with
foreign capital, disciplining local businessmen
who move too strongly against multinational
interests. Such an over-riding state role as con-
flict regulator also questions the likelihood that
the contradictions pointed out by Leys could
emerge significantly. The auxiliary bourgeoisie
remains too state-dependent to extend opposition
to multinational enterprise of a kind that would
create serious instabilities, while the strength of
the State also guarantees that this bourgeoisie can
retain a rising share in the profits of MNC sub-
sidiaries over time.
The implication of all five cases taken together,
then, may simply be that the Kenyan State plays
a subtle and sophisticated role rather well; that
role is to regulate, extend and defend a growing
multinational-State-domestic bourgeoisie symbio-
sis in the country.
What is the economic and social basis of this
symbiosis? Why are the multinationals able to
carve out so prominent a role for themselves?
And why does the Kenyan State play the role it
seems to? Answers could be suggested at many
levels of analysis; but two deserve emphasis in
the present context.
At the level of straightforward economics of in-
dustrialisation, reliance on multinationals in
Kenya has resulted in high rates of profitability in
Kenyan manufacturing. Subsidiaries have trans-
ferred technology from abroad in the form of
differentiated, trade marked products and of fairly
sophisticated processes to manufacture these; and
this kind of technology transfer, especially with
the State helping to offset foreign and local
competition, lends itself to the accumulation of
high profit, or 'monopoly rents' based on the
technology and trade marks. In the 29 Kenyan
manufacturing subsidiaries from which profit de-
tails were obtained in 1972/73, the after tax rates
of return reached 21 per cent of capital employed
(compared to overall rates in the parent firms of
9 per cent after tax). Such high profitability is
a powerful incentive to the State and the local
bourgeoisie to co-operate with the multinationals
in so far as those profits can be shared through
the intermeshing described above. Similarly the
multinationals appear to rely on local co-opera-
tion to maximise the long-run and secure profit-
ability of technology transfer through their sub-
sidiaries to the peripheral economy. Technology
transfer and the local surplus appropriation it
permits are, in short, the main focus of local-
multinational bargaining. Their control of tech-
nological innovation on a world scale, plus the
efficiency of the head-office-to-subsidiary channels
of technology transfer,6 are the key levers which
give the multinationals such bargaining strength
in Kenya, as in other less developed countries.
There is also a second, deeper level at which this
transfer of technology by multinationals provides
the basis for symbiosis. Multinational technology
transfer has shaped the wider process of class
formation and income determination in Kenya in
such a way as to facilitate and sustain a highly
unequal socio-political structure. At the same
time, the income distribution associated with this
6 On concentrated multinational control of the research anddevelopment process see Kaplinsky (1974); on the greater
efficiency of subsidiary technology transfer channels see
Baldwin (1970).
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structure has provided the market required for
the multinationals' transfer of their consumption
technology (an egalitarian income distribution
woúld generate little demand for private auto-
moblies where per capita income is £100 per
year!). Sharing in subsidiary profits, of course,
financially strengthens the emerging bourgeoisie.
But the multinationals' socio-political impact goes
much further than this. Multinational profits and
taxes raise Slate revenueswhich can be used
to defuse periodic political protest through mini-
mal gestures (like eliminating lower-level school
fees in Kenya). More important, Kenyan evidence
suggests that the highly-mechanised nature of
multinational production technology helps to
generate a small, relatively well-paid labour
aristocracy in the country, making working-class
political protest less likely.7 At the same time, as
noted above, the multinationals' growing role
weakens the emergence of independent indus-
trialists in the system, pushing local entrepreneurs
who do succeed into close relations with the State
and/or the subsidiaries; this too weakens the
chances of independent political opposition to the
existing structures.
This whole process, in fact, looks very much like
the pattern of "transnational integration" that
Sunkel discusses: a segment of Kenyan society is
being integrated more fully into transnational
capitalist production through multinational tech-
nology transfer, while most Kenyans remain ex-
cluded from the benefits of the transfer. The
integration of that minority into the transnational
system, though, serves to perpetuate the existing
socio-political structure, through the benefits the
minority clearly does enjoy.
Conclusion
This examination of State-multinational relations
in one country reveals a close symbiosis among
the State, multinationals and the emerging local
bourgeoisiewith the process of multinational
transfer of new product and production tech-
nology at its heart. It has also indicated, however,
the important role of the State in organising and
stabilising the mechanics of this symbiosis in
Kenya. It is in the light of this rather effective
state role that Sunkel's analysis of the likely
relations between the multinationals and the local
bourgeoisie appears more astute than that of
Warren or Leys. The State seems to be critical in
enforcing the symbiosis through which politically
threatening conflicts between foreign and local
7 See the arguments and evidence in Arrighi (1970) and
Amsdm (1971).
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capital are avoided in Kenya, and through which
transnational integration is promoted.
Such a conclusion should reinforce scepticism
about the role of multinationals in less developed
countries. The pattern of multinational-State
relations in Kenya clearly casts doubt on the
view that the local State will control the multi-
nationals on behalf of poor local majorities.
Bargaining is undertaken on behalf of rich local
minorities, and in a context of close State-multi-
national intermeshing of interest. Anew, more
enduring dependency is being shaped for Kenya,
based around this relationship between multi-
nationals and the State, and with consequences of
continuing poverty for the great bulk of Kenyans.
References
Alavi, H., 1972, 'The State in Post-colonial
SocietiesPakistan and Bangladesh', New Left
Review 74
Amsden, A., 1971, International Firms and
Labour in Kenya, 1945-1970, London, Cass
Arrighi, G., 1970, 'International Corporations,
Labour Aristocracies, and Economic Develop-
ment in Tropical Africa', in R. I. Rhodes (cd.),
Imperialism and Underdevelopment, Monthly
Review Press 1970 New York
Baldwin, R. E., 1970, 'International Trade in
Inputs and Outputs', A men can Economic
Review 60 : 2
Chudson, w., 1973, 'Africa and the Multinational
Enterprise', in H. R. Hahlo et al (eds.), Nation-
alism and the Multinational Enterprise, Dobbs
Ferry, New York
Kaplinsky, R., 1974, 'Technology for Develop-
ment', Scienza e Technica, April
Kenya Government, 1966, National Assembly,
House of Representatives, Official Report vol.
XI Part I, Nairobi
Kenya Government, 1972, 'The Consumption Tax
Act', Kenya Gazette Supplement, Acts 1972,
Nairobi
Langdon, S. W., 1976, 'Multinational Corpora-
tions in the Political Economy of Kenya', D.
Phil. thesis, Sussex
Lamb, Geoff, 1975, 'Marxism, Access and the
State', Development and C/ian ge, VI : 2 April
Leys, C., 1975, Underdevelopment in Kenya,
Heinemann, London
Marris, P. and A. Somerset, 1971, African
Businessmen, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London
Reuber, G. L., 1973, Private Foreign Investment
in Development, OUP, London
Saul, John, 1974, 'The State in Post-Colonial
SocietiesTanzania', Socialist Register
Sunkel, Osvaldo, 1973, 'Transnational Capitalism
and National Disintegration in Latin America',
Social and Economic Studies, 22 : 1
Sunkel, Osvaldo, 1974, 'External Economic Re-
lationships and the Process of Development:
Suggestions for an Alternative Analytical
Framework', in R. B. Williamson et al, Latin
AmericanUS Economic Interactions, Ameri-
can Enterprise Institution for Public Policy
Research 1974 Washington
Warren, B., 1973, 'Imperialism and Capitalist
industrialisation', New Left Review, 81
41
